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1. INTRODUCTION
This article examines major prosecutions in New South Wales and 
Queensland for blackbirding practices in Melanesian waters, and 
early regulation under the Imperial Kidnapping Act that was meant to 
correct problems those prosecutions raised. It considers how legal 
argument and adjudication appropriated the political debate on the 
question whether the trade in Melanesian labour to Queensland and 
Fiji amounted to slaving, and whether references to slaving in 
Australian courts only compounded the difficulties of deterring 
recruiting abuses in Melanesia. It is suggested that, even though the 
Imperial Government conceived of the Kidnapping Act as a measure 
to deal with slaving, its success in Australian courts depended on its 
avoiding any reference to the idea of slavery in the legislation itself. 
This is developed in three parts. Part 1 provides the social context, 
introducing the trade in Melanesian labour for work in Queensland. 
Part 2 explores the prosecutions brought under the slave trade 
legislation and at common law against labour recruiters, especially 
those arising from incidents involving the Daphne and the Jason. It 
attempts to uncover the way that lawyers in these cases used 
arguments from the broader political debate as to whether the trade 
amounted to slaving. Part 3 concludes with an account of the 
relatively more effective regulation brought by the Kidnapping Act, 
with tentative suggestions as to how the arguments about slaving in 
Australian courts influenced the form that regulation under the Act 
had to take.
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2. THE MELANESIAN LABOUR TRADE
Between 1863 and 1904, over 62,000 people from the Melanesian 
archipelagos provided the colony of Queensland with indentured 
labour for its emerging agricultural industries.1 A Sydney 
parliamentarian and merchant, Captain Robert Towns, first arranged 
for a sandalwood trader operating from Tanna, Henry Ross Lewin, to 
recruit islanders from the Loyalty and New Hebrides Groups in 1863. 
They were employed at Towns’ cotton plantation on the Logan River; 
and cotton growing, with the sheep, cattle, pearl shelling, fisheries 
and domestic service industries became significant employers of 
island labour over the next 15 years. However, the sugar plantations 
on the river plains around Brisbane, Maryborough, Bundaberg, 
Mackay, Bowen and Cairns led the demand for indentured labour 
over the next 40 years. From 1880, when Melanesians were restricted 
to employment in ‘tropical and semi-tropical agriculture’, island 
labour was effectively concentrated in the cane-fields.[2]
In the modern era, the establishing of sugar industries has almost 
always been condemned as a morally disreputable project. The large 
and intensive manual inputs required (before mechanisation) to grow 
sugar cane as a commercial crop meant that profitability depended on 
the maintenance of low labour costs. Caribbean planters could 
initially only make sugar growing rewarding through the use of 
African slave labour. Although by the latter nineteenth century, 
abolitionism had ended both the transatlantic slave trade and slavery 
in European colonies, indentured labourers (or libres engagés) were 
sought as an alternative: working under limited term contracts and 
wages but otherwise, on occasion, similar conditions to the slaves. 
Indentured labour also nurtured new sugar industries in Mauritius, 
Réunion, Natal and Hawaii.3 Queensland was no exception, 
attempting under its early conservative administrations to develop 
plantation agriculture, experiencing labour shortages and, in any case, 
limited by the popular belief that Europeans were unsuited to manual 
work in the tropics. Parliament permitted the engagement of 
indentured labour from India in 1862,[4] but this failed after the 
Government refused to carry the costs of Indian immigration. At that 
point Towns turned to Melanesia and, the venture proving successful, 
many followed. From 1864, European planters in Fiji and, from 1865, 
New Caledonia would sponsor recruiting from the same islands.5 For 
Queensland, the New Hebrides, Torres and Banks Groups (that 
http://www.paclii.org/journals/fJSPL/vol04/7.shtml (2 of 30)3/08/2009 4:41:53 PM
SLAVING IN AUSTRALIAN COURTS: BLACKBIRDING CASES
became Vanuatu) officially provided about 30,400 registered workers. 
The Solomons and Santa Cruz Group received more attention from 
the 1880s, providing about 13,300 workers. New Guinea and other 
islands provided about 16,200 workers, and the Loyalties about 1000. 
Melanesians in Queensland (excluding Torres Strait Islanders) peaked 
at 11,500 in 1883.6 However, in Vanuatu the recruiting for 
Queensland, Fiji and New Caledonia seems to have contributed to a 
significant depopulation of the islands. In the period between 1860 
and 1910 (when there was an estimated 60,00 inhabitants), the 
population at least quartered.[7]
From its beginning,[8] the debate in Queensland and New South 
Wales (where business had a large capital investment in the labour 
trade) about this trade has been conceptualised and argued in terms of 
slavery.9 This is understandable: plantation agriculture, the colour and 
imagined African origins of Melanesian people, Britain’s criticism 
that the Franco-Portuguese trade in libres engagés masked slaving, 
and the coincidence of the early period of the trade with the American 
Civil War naturally meant that the accusation of slave trading arose. 
For the best and worst motives, humanitarians (including the Anti-
Slavery Society),[10] missionaries, the Royal Navy, organised labour, 
nascent White Australians, the liberal press, Liberal politicians in the 
colonies and the United Kingdom, colonial officials (including 
Governors of Queensland), and even Queen Victoria described the 
labour trade as slaving. On the other hand, conservative politicians in 
Queensland and, of course, the planters and merchants who undertook 
the trade strenuously denied the allegation.11 For different reasons, 
recent academic assessments tend to dismiss it as well: the trade had 
appalling abuses, but thorough review of the documentary material 
and a more refined notion of ‘slavery’ show that the trade and service 
under indentures in Queensland did not, generally, deserve the 
description.[12]
I am not entering this debate. However, I do consider how useful the 
question of slaving was when it was raised in cases on the labour 
trade decided in the eastern colonies of Australia. The law was 
certainly a significant tool for managing the Melanesian labour trade: 
immigration to Queensland;[13] conditions of work;[14] labourers’ 
return to the islands;[15] and the harsh deportations once, under the 
White Australia Policy, the trade was abandoned.[16] It was used in 
comparable, but less intensive, ways in Fiji under the Cakobau 
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Government and, after 1874, the colonial administration.[17] 
However, the relevant cases were decided at the height of the 
recruiting abuses that took place in the islands, and which 
undoubtedly added weight to abolitionists’ arguments that Melanesian 
people were being enslaved. In general, these abuses were of two 
kinds. First, the more prevalent abuse was the engagement of 
islanders who did not appreciate the nature or conditions of 
indentured service. This was especially so before 1875 when contact 
between Melanesians and Europeans was only being established, 
there were few returning labourers to explain the nature of service in 
Queensland, and interpreters were scarce. There was also blatant 
misrepresentation, particularly about the period of service.[18] The 
second abuse was physical abduction, euphemised as ‘blackbird-
hunting’ or ‘blackbirding’. This was a more generally held concern 
about the labour trade, even amongst planters.[19] Ross Lewin, 
deservedly, was the subject of blackbirding rumours from the 
beginning of the trade.[20] The allegations were being extended by 
1868, when the French Government complained about the predations 
of Queensland recruiters in New Caledonia and the Loyalties.[21] 
Blackbirding practices included the enticing of islanders onto ships on 
the pretence that the crew wanted to barter or to offer them a short 
pleasure cruise, or ambushing villages and seizing the inhabitants. 
Either Lewin or his mate, John Coath, pioneered the trick of 
impersonating a missionary, and seizing any islanders who 
approached or inviting them to visit the ship’s cabin. John Patteson, 
Anglican Bishop of Melanesia, was a common masquerade.22 
Saunders estimated that up to 1000 Melanesians officially brought 
into Queensland had been abducted by these methods.23 No estimates 
exist for those smuggled into the colony.
The cases involving the Daphne and the Jason were prosecutions for 
blackbirding, and are interesting for several reasons. First, they 
involved charges under the slave trade legislation and for common 
law offences. The colonial courts were therefore applying standards 
developed far from the location of the trade, either under imperial 
legislation or, where jurisdiction arose because the events occurred on 
a British ship, under English (and not necessarily colonial) criminal 
law. This made the courts a collective forum that was more, though 
not completely, detached from both the mercantile and plantation 
interests that generated the trade and, also, the imperial lawmaker. So 
although in Queensland the executive and legislative policies on the 
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Melanesian labour trade have been examined closely, the more 
sceptical position of the Supreme Court has been bypassed 
completely. Secondly, the failure of the prosecutions for slave trading 
is recognised as a significant reason for special imperial measures to 
deal with blackbirding in the Kidnapping Acts.24 However, the legal 
reasons that made the slave trade legislation inapplicable to Melanesia 
have not yet been explored. Historians have been unaware of the 
significance of different legal arguments and, for that matter, have 
confused who argued what or why.25 The third reason is related. The 
arguments submitted in these cases juridified many aspects of the 
public debate about slaving in the Pacific. As a result the blackbirding 
cases present an example of an independent reading of imperial law in 
the colonies and, yet, how this stimulated even further imperial 
intervention.
3. BLACKBIRDING PROSECUTIONS
The slave trade laws
The responsibility for policing the labour trade in the Pacific rested 
with the Royal Navy, which, in the 1860s, permanently stationed up 
to six ships in Sydney Harbour. Its powers were limited: men-of-war 
were only able to seize ships engaged in piracy in iure gentium, for 
crimes on British vessels, and for offences under the slave trade 
legislation. Through the 1860s the Colonial Office considered that the 
slave trade legislation would be adequate to address recruiting abuses 
in Melanesia although, treaties with other countries being limited to 
the Atlantic, it could only be enforced against British ships.26 
Accordingly, when naval patrols first intercepted suspected Australian 
blackbirders in Melanesia, the slave trade legislation was immediately 
raised as the justification for seizing the vessels and detaining the 
masters. 
Great Britain’s anti-slaving laws emerged in the 1770s, while British 
merchants still dominated American slave markets, with the 
recognition at common law that slaves in transit in an English port 
could be landed ‘free’.27 However, the nineteenth century program for 
abolition rested on prerogative order and legislation. The landmarks 
included: prohibiting the import of slaves to the Caribbean colonies 
wrested from France, Holland and Spain (1805); prohibiting British 
subjects selling slaves into foreign territories (1806); prohibiting 
British subjects engaging in the slave trade or importing slaves into a 
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British colony (1807); deeming slave trading on the high seas to be 
piracy (1824); the abolition of slavery in all British colonies, 
plantations and possessions (1833); and prohibiting any British 
subject, wherever resident, to hold or trade in slaves (1843).28 This 
program extended the imperial Parliament to the limits of its 
international competence, although in the 1820s it began to enlarge its 
powers over foreign shipping by treaty. Reforming legislation also 
addressed mechanical problems of enforcement; the most significant 
being the ‘equipment clause’ that appeared in treaties after 1822. The 
equipment clause obviated the need to show that slaves were actually 
found on board before a ship could be proved a slaver.29 Without the 
equipment clause, naval patrols had to wait until Africans were 
loaded onto a ship before it could be detained. Furthermore, a slaver 
being observed by a patrol could escape detention by landing its 
slaves on the coast or tossing them overboard before being 
intercepted.30 The ‘equipment clause’ enabled a ship to be detained 
and condemned if it was noticeably equipped for slaving. Usual 
‘signs’ of a slaver included: open gratings (instead of closed hatches) 
to allow ventilation in the hold; extra bulkheads and large planks to fit 
slave decks that increased the ship’s carrying capacity; irons and 
shackles; or supplies of food, water and matting that exceeded the 
needs of the crew. Efforts were made to include equipment clauses in 
Britain’s anti-slaving treaties with other European powers and the 
United States between 1822 and 1862.31 The Slave Trade Act 1839 
(UK) that incorporated the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty was of general 
application, and included an equipment clause by which a ship was 
presumed to be a slaver if it was found equipped for the slave trade.32 
If a seized ship carried, say, excessive supplies of food and water, the 
onus in proceedings for condemning the ship was on the master or 
owner to prove that the supplies were used for a legal purpose.
The slave trade laws and indentured labour
The ad hoc legislative reforms of the anti-slaving program helped 
eventually to corner the transatlantic slave trade, but by the mid-
1850s they had also deflected commercial energies into the trade in 
indentured labour. Here, the application of the slave trade legislation 
was thought possible, but more generally doubted. The Colonial 
Office assumed that it could deal with the Melanesian labour trade, 
but this was exceptional.33 The legislation was obviously limited to 
conduct that had ‘slavery’ as its end. Strangely, for all the legislative 
energy devoted to the slave trade and its exegesis in the Admiralty 
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courts, English law never developed a definition of ‘slavery’ that 
would clarify the point.[34]
As will be seen, the New South Wales courts reached a conclusion 
about the status of indentured labour under the slave trade legislation 
in 1869. But it was only in 1880, in R v Casaca,[35] that the Privy 
Council held that the indentured labour trade was beyond the reach of 
the slave trade legislation and, by implication, that the conditions of 
indentured labour in the Portuguese colony of São Tomé were not 
slavery. Casaca was a strong decision in this respect as, when seized, 
the suspect ship, the Ovarense, was found fitted with shackles, a large 
number of water casks, and excess food and matting. It also appeared 
that west Africans on board had been kidnapped, to be delivered to 
São Tomé against their wills as ‘free’ contract labourers. Sir Robert 
Phillimore, England’s leading Admiralty judge, considered that the 
presumption of the equipment clause was rebutted once the master 
showed that he was licensed by the Portuguese Government to carry 
indentured labour to the colony: a legal purpose. The forcing of men 
into indentured labour was ‘a purpose other than that “of consigning 
the men to slavery”’, and so a detention of the Ovarense under the 
slave trade legislation was held to be unlawful.[36]
The Daphne
However harsh, Casaca illuminates the decisions made in New South 
Wales 11 years earlier and at what points the reasoning in those 
decisions can be considered legitimate, in contemporaneous terms at 
least. The schooner Daphne was registered in Melbourne to a South 
Australian, Thomas Pritchard, who either chartered it to Ross Lewin 
or entered partnership with him. Lewin arranged the refitting of the 
ship as a recruiter, and secured a licence to carry 58 labourers into 
Queensland under that colony’s Polynesian Labourers Act. The ship 
left Brisbane in February 1868, skippered by an American, John 
Daggett, and recruited over 100 islanders from Tanna, Erromango and 
Éfaté. The licensed number was taken to Brisbane, and the others 
remained on Tanna. There was a second voyage in 1869 that mustered 
108 recruits: Loyalty and Banks islanders were added to those left on 
Tanna, where the Daphne arrived in March. According to Pritchard, 
they decided at that point that the Daphne should sail to Fiji. The 
motivation was twofold. Lewin’s reception in Brisbane was becoming 
increasingly hostile. After the Daphne’s first voyage, he had been 
prosecuted unsuccessfully for the rape of a 13-year-old Tannese girl 
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whom he had kept as a concubine.37 It was best he never returned. 
Also, in Fiji the recruiters could get £6 for each of 108 islanders, 
where in Queensland they could get £9 for each of only the 58 that the 
Daphne was permitted to carry under that colony’s legislation.
Lewin remained on Tanna. The Daphne sailed on to Levuka, on 
Ovalau, and was met there by a man-of-war: HMS Rosario, on patrol 
from Sydney. Rosario’s captain, George Palmer, had served on west 
African patrols and thought that the Daphne looked much like a 
transatlantic slaver, excepting the irons. The sleeping quarters had no 
bedding or matting. The ship was crowded. The islanders appeared 
undernourished. Although Pritchard produced the Queensland 
licences, the ship itself did not comply with the Queensland 
legislation and had not been carrying the food, clothing or supplies for 
the passengers that it required. The licences were made out to Lewin, 
who was not there, and showed that the Daphne was to take 58 
labourers west to Brisbane when it had taken 108 east to Levuka. 
Palmer later testified that his suspicions were really aroused by the 
references to Lewin on the Queensland licences, as he had learned of 
Ross Lewin as a ‘man-stealer and a kidnapper’.38 He concluded that 
the Daphne was a slaver, detained Pritchard and Daggett, and had 
them taken with the Daphne to Sydney.39 The islanders were placed 
under the care of Sir John Thurston, the resident British consul in 
Levuka.
The Daphne: prosecution for piracy
The charges of slaving brought against Pritchard and Daggett in the 
Sydney Water Police Court were dismissed, as was the action to have 
the Daphne condemned in the Vice-Admiralty Court. A bench that, 
after some challenge,[40] ultimately comprised Water Police 
Magistrate Cloete and Mr A Learmonth JP had to determine whether 
Daggett and Pritchard could be tried under section 9 of the Slave 
Trade Act 1824 (UK), which made it piracy to carry people - 
knowingly and wilfully - by sea to another place for the purpose of 
using them as slaves. At the committal, defence counsel William 
Bede Dalley had the better of the Crown prosecutor, Richard 
Windeyer, who had only been briefed the night before.41 Questioning 
from both concentrated on whether the islanders had willingly 
boarded the ship, or consented to the ‘re-engagement’ from 
Queensland to Fiji.42 While this addressed the undercurrent of 
blackbirding to these events, it was insufficient for the charge of 
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slaving. Windeyer had to produce evidence that labouring conditions 
in Fiji constituted slavery, and on this point he adduced very little. In 
evidence Palmer admitted that he did not know how much labourers 
were paid in Fiji, and that rations differed considerably between 
plantations. He thought that the engagements were generally for two 
years, and had been told by Thurston, the British consul, that 
labourers were returned ‘punctually’ at the expense of the planter 
once their employment expired. His lieutenant, Richard Bingham, 
said that he knew nothing of the supply of labour in Fiji, except that 
there was no regulation of labour conditions there.43 The only 
evidence that came close to supporting the charge of slave trading 
was Palmer’s testimony that Daggett had explained to him that he had 
come to Levuka because they could get a higher price for the 
islanders there than in Queensland.[44]
The committal turned on that point. Dalley argued that there was no 
case to answer, as to establish piracy under the slave trade legislation 
there had to be proof both that the islanders had been removed to 
Levuka for use as slaves and that this had been done knowingly and 
wilfully. Windeyer accepted that, but argued briefly that the islanders 
were treated as slaves as soon as Daggett nominated the price he 
would get for them in Levuka.45 On Friday 28 June, Cloete and 
Learmonth ruled that Daggett would not be committed to trial for 
piracy. The same followed for Pritchard. This is an understandable 
result, given that the evidence that the recruiters were ‘selling’ the 
islanders to planters in Fiji was at best ambiguous. Still, the reasons 
that the court gave are more doubtful. First, the court found no 
evidence that the islanders had been brought on board the Daphne by 
illegal means like seduction or compulsion. Secondly, the court found 
that there was no evidence that Daggett deported the islanders to a 
place where they would be dealt with as slaves: ‘as the place where 
they were taken was not a slave country’.46 Strictly, neither 
conclusion should have properly defeated charges of slave trading. 
Forcible abduction might help to establish treatment as slaves, but the 
absence of ‘seduction or compulsion’ at the time men boarded the 
recruiting vessel did not preclude a finding of enslavement. Further, 
the finding that Fiji ‘was not a slave country’ did not rule out the 
possibility that the islanders could be dealt with as slaves, as it was 
recognised under slave trade legislation that slavery could still be 
conducted illegally where it was prohibited.47 The court did not 
address evidence that some of the islanders’ re-engagement to Fiji 
occurred without any real understanding that this meant a redirection 
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to Fiji, and that the documents recording this were backdated. It also 
did not consider the significance of the payment that Daggett, 
Pritchard and Lewin were to receive from the planters. Cloete and 
Learmonth did recognise that the Daphne incident showed 
irregularities under the Queensland legislation (under which they had 
no jurisdiction). However, Fiji had a resident British consul and local 
merchants had not established a slave trade.[48]
The action to condemn the Daphne
Legally, the significance of the magistrates’ decision not to commit 
Daggett and Pritchard to trial should not be overestimated. However, 
it was paralleled and extended in the more influential decision of the 
Vice-Admiralty Court in Palmer’s proceedings under the slave trade 
legislation to have the Daphne condemned. The judge commissary in 
the Sydney Vice-Admiralty Court was the Chief Justice, Sir Alfred 
Stephen, a sober and respected legal technician and reformer.49 Here, 
Palmer’s lawyers thought there would be fewer evidential problems, 
as the equipment clause was available.50 Evidence was submitted to 
the court in August 1869, but even before legal argument was heard 
on 24 September Stephen doubted that much could come of the 
allegations. Sometime in late August, he sent a note to Sir William 
Manning - Palmer’s lawyer – hinting that Palmer should reconsider 
the action for condemning the ship. At that stage of the proceedings 
Stephen did not think that the evidence established that the islanders 
were taken on board the Daphne as slaves, or would be sold into 
slavery. He wrote that ‘[i]t will not be enough to show that artifice has 
been used, or even falsehood told, to induce the natives to enter into 
the agreements or contracts mentioned ... The captor will have 
substantially to prove that the natives were going to be passed into a 
state of real slavery by those who had taken them on board the 
“Daphne”, or were to be put in a state really amounting to slavery, 
and in violation of the agreement, and against their will’.51 Stephen 
evaded a positive definition of slavery for these purposes. Palmer 
rightly understood that the Chief Justice was concluding that it would 
not constitute slavery for a merchant to sell islanders to a planter at a 
nominated sum per head, even if he had enticed islanders to board the 
ship by tricks or deception.52 But Palmer persisted. As expected, 
Stephen dismissed the action on 24 September without requiring 
Pritchard’s and Daggett’s barrister to respond to Manning’s argument 
that the Daphne was a slaver.53 However, his reasons had changed, 
and he delivered a stronger judgment against Palmer than the letter to 
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Manning had foreshadowed.
Stephen had been associated with the Clapham Sect, and into the 
1870s remained personally opposed to the labour trade.54 In the 
Daphne, he censured Pritchard and Daggett for their moral 
recklessness.55 That was nevertheless not enough to make it slaving, 
and there was nothing to prove that the islanders were treated as 
slaves in Fiji. Stephen thought it significant that there was a British 
consul at Levuka, and that many islanders were aware of the 
labouring conditions in Fiji. In general, he thought that they returned 
home once the indentures expired. Evidence that planters on Ovalau 
paid the recruiters a sum per head for Melanesian labour and that 
there were islanders who were unable to secure a return passage home 
was recounted without comment. All of this could pass, especially 
since the evidence presented for condemnation was the same as the 
evidence presented in the Water Police Court for piracy. However, 
unlike the magistrates Stephen had to deal with the effect of the 
equipment clause. The fact that the Daphne had provision for a large 
number of passengers was enough under the equipment clause for the 
presumption of slaving to arise. That did not necessarily guarantee the 
condemnation of the vessel. Pritchard and Daggett only had to rebut 
the presumption by showing that the fittings were used on the voyage 
for a legal purpose and, by this time, the Chief Justice had accepted 
that the market for Melanesian labour in Fiji was lawful.
However, Pritchard’s and Daggett’s lawyer was not called on to argue 
any defence, let alone to rebut the presumption of the equipment 
clause. Stephen dismissed Palmer’s action against the Daphne for 
other reasons. Significantly, he concluded that the Slave Trade Act 
1839 did not apply in the South Pacific:
... that enactment ... was passed in respect of vessels found in very 
different latitudes, and under very different circumstances, from those 
in question here. On various parts of the coast of Africa, from which 
negro slaves were brought, and of the coasts of America to which 
they were usually taken, a vessel occasionally was discovered having 
not one single slave, or the traces of one on board, yet with fittings 
up, and quantities and kinds of food, showing unmistakably her 
employment; that human beings, and presumably negroes, had been 
or were to be her cargo. Passengers of any kind did not exist in those 
regions.... But it is absurd to imagine, that the enactment was intended 
or could operate to compel a Court, against the strongest evidence and 
in violation of the truth, to pronounce a trading vessel in these seas a 
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slaver, because she had on board, with the necessary fittings, an 
improper number of passengers; they being free labourers expressly 
engaged as such ... .[56]
The proceedings were therefore dismissed, purely on legal grounds. 
The effect of the Daphne
Stephen’s letter to Manning and, to an extent, his judgment in the 
Daphne were portents of Sir Robert Phillimore’s assessment of the 
indentured labour trade in Casaca. The slave trade legislation did not 
proscribe man-stealing, if the captives, however unwilling, were 
destined to be employed for a fixed term and were promised some 
payment. That result would have been enough for the Imperial 
Government to introduce special measures for blackbirding, but in the 
Daphne the Chief Justice went further and doubted the operation of 
slave trade legislation in the region altogether. It was reported and 
publicised in other Australian colonies in those terms.[57] This 
developed conclusions reached earlier in the Water Police Court, but 
the reasoning was heterodox. In both courts the language used 
paralleled a prominent argument used by planters and conservatives 
that the trade to Queensland could not be slaving as slavery could not 
exist in a British colony. As Saunders stressed, this conflated two 
distinct questions: the ideal that the law sought to achieve, and the 
actual abuses it was intended to eliminate.[58] The law was used to 
establish fact. The magistrates concluded that the islanders on the 
Daphne were not destined for enslavement because Fiji was a free 
territory, a British consul lived there and, a complete non sequitur, 
Sydney merchants had not established a slave trade. Stephen merely 
declared, without analysis, that the slave trade legislation was not 
intended to presume that a vessel in Melanesia was a slaver merely 
because it was equipped to carry more passengers than the law 
allowed. Again, emphasis was placed on the residence of a British 
consul in Fiji. In a more sophisticated way, therefore, the judgment 
rested this doubt that the Slave Trade Act could apply in the South 
Pacific on the assertion that there was no slave trade there. For 
Stephen it was an uncharacteristically adventurous conclusion, and 
overlooked technical features of the legislation.59 However, it had 
strategic significance. Merely dismissing Palmer’s action on the 
evidential ground that, in the Daphne, conditions in Fiji were not 
shown to constitute slavery still might invite prosecutions where the 
evidence differed, and Stephen himself would hear cases where the 
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evidence did differ. The legal conclusion that slave trade legislation 
did not apply in the Pacific should have silenced allegations of 
slaving in the courts completely. With one eccentric exception in 
Queensland, that is precisely what the Daphne achieved.
Common law offences
The failure of the prosecution for slaving in the Daphne led colonial 
authorities to rely on more conventional offences of the English 
criminal law, which could apply if the events occurred on a British 
ship.[60] This was necessarily the case for charges of homicide. In 
May 1869 Albert Hovell, master of the Young Australian, and his 
mate Rangi were sentenced to death in Sydney for the murder of three 
Paamans, and in December 1872 two crew from the Carl were 
convicted of manslaughter as a result of a massacre off 
Bougainville.61 A petition secured mercy for Hovell and Rangi, but 
the Young Australian convictions absorbed the public in Sydney 
throughout mid-1869, invigorated the slavery question, and magnified 
the significance attached to the Daphne prosecutions that began in the 
next month.62 The change in prosecutorial policy in cases where no 
killing was alleged came with R v Longmuir. The schooner Challenge 
was seized in Levuka in May 1871, after the consul learned of two 
incidents of attempted abduction off Vanua Lava and in the Torres 
Islands. His intention was to prosecute the master, Alexander 
Longmuir, under the slave trade legislation. However, the New South 
Wales Attorney-General, Sir James Martin, recommended that 
Longmuir be prosecuted for assault and that no proceedings be 
brought to have the ship condemned. Even if Longmuir’s intentions 
could be proved, the decision in the Daphne had resolved that 
indentured labour in Fiji did not amount to slavery. So, Longmuir was 
committed to trial for assault. He was convicted on two counts, and 
sentenced to three years imprisonment.[63]
Lewin’s earlier prosecution for rape and the Young Australian case 
raised legal points about the admissibility of islanders’ evidence,[64] 
but the common law cases brought no other important legal 
developments. R v Coath[65] did, as it saw the Supreme Court of 
Queensland articulate the common law of kidnapping to meet the 
problem of ‘man-stealing’ in Melanesia. This was also the first 
significant decision on blackbirding in the colony that had caused the 
problem. Ironically, Coath shows that the arguments that the labour 
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trade amounted to slaving received a more sympathetic hearing from 
the Queensland judges.
The Jason
The prosecution in Coath arose from the voyage of the schooner 
Jason from Maryborough to Tanna, Nguna and Epi in the summer of 
1870 and 1871. The Jason had raised suspicions on its return to 
Maryborough in March 1871, after a Presbyterian missionary on 
Nguna claimed that the Jason’s crew had tried to abduct two Ngunan 
women and a man. Later, one of the Jason’s crew recounted that John 
Coath, the ship’s captain (who had served under Lewin), arranged the 
abduction in January 1871 of two men from Tanna, and in February 
of nine men from a canoe off Epi. These men were landed at 
Maryborough. However, nothing came of these allegations until after 
the Jason’s second voyage to the New Hebrides in April 1871. This 
time the ship was carrying a government agent, John Meiklejohn, a 
respected Maryborough sugar planter. Witnessing the abduction of 
nine men and a boy off Ambrym, Meiklejohn had protested to Coath, 
only to be threatened with a pistol. He was handcuffed to a ring-bolt 
in the hold and, with the captured Ambrymese, ultimately spent five 
weeks there. Only on the day before docking in Maryborough was 
Meiklejohn released, and he was found by friends in a mentally 
deranged state. Investigations followed, and eventually led to Coath’s 
prosecution for kidnapping and assault for the abductions during the 
first voyage. There were similar charges for the capture of the 
Ambrymese during the second voyage, but the key witness, 
Meiklejohn, was so incoherent that they were withdrawn.66 However, 
at trial in Brisbane Coath was convicted on the charge of kidnapping 
the nine Epinese and was sentenced by Mr Justice Alfred Lutwyche to 
five years imprisonment and a £50 fine.
Lutwyche had directed the jurors that the charge of kidnapping would 
be proved if they were satisfied that any of the nine islanders were 
brought on board the Jason or detained there against their wills, and 
then carried away to another place. In December 1871, Charles Lilley 
QC, Coath’s barrister, had a case stated to the whole Supreme Court. 
The court only had two judges: so Lutwyche himself and the Chief 
Justice, Sir James Cockle, heard the reference.[67]
The Jason defence: saved, not stolen
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Lilley’s argument was unfettered British supremacism: the Epinese 
had been saved, not stolen.68 They were landed as free men in a 
British colony and under the protection of English law.
The moment these islanders touched the deck of an English vessel 
they were free, and had a right to habeas corpus. They were landed at 
Maryborough and allowed to land free .... [69]
Lilley argued that, at common law, kidnapping only occurs when a 
person is taken from the protection of English law or is concealed in a 
British dominion and effectively deprived of the protection of English 
law. The precise opposite had occurred in this case: ‘[i]t is no offence 
to go to islands inhabited by a savage and barbarous people, and to 
bring these people into the protection of English law.’70 Lilley was 
necessarily suggesting that blackbirding practices were, as a rule, 
lawful, and that the Epinese benefited from them.71 This argument 
depended on the free status that the islanders were recognised as 
having in Queensland, and side-tracked Lilley into submissions on the 
question of slavery. Dredd Scott[72] was cited, as was the Daphne. It 
also assumed, without elaboration, that peoples in the New Hebrides 
and the Fijis were not ‘free’, at least not in the sense that ‘free’ status 
was recognised by Europeans. Had the Jason taken the men to Fiji, a 
kidnapping would have occurred because they would have been taken 
from a British vessel where they were ‘free’ and landed in a place that 
was not (in 1871) in the British dominions.[73]
The Attorney-General, John Bramston, replied with a simple 
argument. Kidnapping occurs when there is a ‘violation of that 
personal liberty which the law of England recognises in every man’,
[74]
 and this personal liberty was recognised wherever a person was, 
and whoever the person was. Undoubtedly Lilley’s was a dangerous 
argument and, as Bramston reminded the court, discounted the 
damage done to the public generally when abduction is permitted. If 
accepted, blackbirding would be endorsed by the common law, and 
what little disincentive the criminal law currently was to the recruiters 
would vanish. However, Lilley was right in one respect. There was no 
precedent for the conviction.75 Coath was a novel case, and the court 
had to explore the policies beneath the law of kidnapping to uphold 
the conviction. There was also the problem that the colony lacked 
adequate legal resources, as the only cases that its leading counsel 
could cite to the court were both decided in 1683, and neither 
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concerned the law of kidnapping.76 The Chief Justice openly 
speculated as to what the common law had been, and what it now was.
[77]
Lilley had actually reforged an old slaver’s argument. In Queensland, 
supporters of the labour trade would claim well into the twentieth 
century that, irrespective of how Melanesians were brought to the 
colony, the civilising influence of the more advanced European world 
could, by long exposure to it, only improve them.[78] This, perhaps 
unwisely, had been borrowed from the ante-bellum South. It was 
often claimed that African slaves lived better as the property of a 
benevolent planter who would educate and Christianise them, than in 
their original barbarism without hope of salvation.[79] Lilley distorted 
this already distorted paternalism. Unable to contest the jury’s finding 
that the Epinese had been captured and taken involuntarily to 
Queensland, he could only invert the usual legal construction that this 
was putting free men under restraint. Enslaved men were being freed. 
Although the argument drew on contemporary European images of 
Melanesia as a place where life was brutal and short and where men 
were still in chains, no one was convinced that the technical 
availability of habeas corpus on a colonial blackbirder made it a better 
place for an islander than Epi or Fiji. The argument’s overreaching 
defeated itself. Cockle was led to believe that Coath really was slave 
trading, and Lutwyche did not even deign to respond.
Cockle on the Jason: slaving in the South Seas
It was not a court that exemplified doctrinal purity, and Lilley’s 
submissions on slavery led Cockle into an unusual approach to the 
question of kidnapping. A celebrated mathematician and Fellow of 
the Royal Society, he had been appointed Chief Justice because he 
was a ‘gentleman rather than a mere lawyer’[80] and his judgment 
shows both qualities. Cockle denied that the point should be decided 
upon emotional grounds, but delivered an affecting, extemporaneous 
judgment: describing an old, captive Epinese man weeping for his 
relatives on shore, and the cries of those who had lost him. He 
deprecated a callous crew more concerned to catch the islanders on 
board than to help one who risked a swim to shore.81 It just seemed 
wrong.
[W]e must consider whether one subject of Her Majesty is at liberty 
to fit out a vessel to sail amongst these apparently savage and 
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guideless islanders, and seize them and appropriate their property as 
appears to have been done in this case.[82]
That intuition was reinforced by the matters of public policy that 
Bramston had submitted to the court. So, again denying that the court 
could create an offence where one was not already recognised at 
common law, the Chief Justice thought that he could consider the 
consequences if the conviction were quashed.83 However, he 
eventually did consider the legality of Coath’s conviction and, in this 
connection, did so almost entirely by reference to the law of slavery. 
‘I think that the cases decided upon the point of slavery are valuable 
and important.’84 He recognised that enslavement had been practised 
in the transatlantic trade, and that even English courts had recognised 
persons as slaves if slavery were legal where they lived. This was 
where Queensland’s poor legal resources failed him as Cockle could 
only hypothesise whether slavery had in the past been lawful, or 
unlawful but undeterred. At this point, he seems to respond to Lilley’s 
assumption that the status of Melanesians was not ‘free’. Irrespective 
of whether the law had recognised slavery, Cockle thought that where 
the liberty of any person was involved any submission that they could 
lawfully be placed under restraint had to be examined carefully.85 He 
could find no right to do so. Then, the Chief Justice blended his moral 
indignation with a presumption against enslaved status, humanitarian 
concerns and the colony’s commercial interests:
This [labour] trade is carried on across the highway through which 
much of the commerce of these parts passes ...; and if once amongst 
these nations an opinion should get abroad that our law proceeded 
upon principles so inhuman that their rights could be violated with 
impunity by any man who may choose to sally forth to outrage them, 
I say that the safety of commerce itself and the blessings it 
maintains ... would be endangered; and I think that in saying this I am 
only drawing an inference that the Common Law itself would draw.
[86]
In short, Cockle held that Coath’s conviction for kidnapping should 
stand because he should not be permitted to enslave islanders.
Lutwyche on the Jason: kidnapping and piracy
The Chief Justice admitted that he only had ‘a general view of the 
case’, and so far as the technicalities of the law of kidnapping were 
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concerned deferred to Lutwyche’s opinion.[87] Unsurprisingly, 
Lutwyche thought that the directions he gave at trial were correct. He 
addressed the offence of kidnapping directly, with only the slightest 
allusion to the question of enslavement. Long known as a pugnacious 
liberal egalitarian,[88] Lutwyche held that islanders ‘have a right to 
liberty, which is inherent in all human beings, although at times that 
inherent right has been taken away by force’.89 It followed that it 
must also be assumed that the Epinese had the status of freemen when 
they were captured, and so it could not be argued that any restraint 
applied by the Jason’s crew was lawful. Lutwyche thought that one 
form of kidnapping involved the stealing and removal of any human 
being, not merely British subjects. Coath might have been a novel 
case, but it was easily an example of this kind of kidnapping. The 
conviction therefore should be upheld.[90]
For the times, R v Coath represents a tough assessment of a European 
labour recruiter. The Chief Justice had equated Coath’s conduct with 
slave trading, and Lutwyche, in a postscript to his judgment,[91] had 
hinted that Coath should have been prosecuted for piracy. The 
Government was not so inclined, and Bramston himself, after 
interviewing the Epinese at Maryborough, eventually recommended 
that Coath be pardoned. R v Coath was nevertheless a singular 
precedent, was the most severe judgment made for blackbirding 
before the Kidnapping Act, and supported Lilley’s own harsh 
sentences for kidnapping (and murder) in the Hopeful case in 1884.92 
It was also the last appearance of the slaving question in an Australian 
court. Though idiosyncratic, Sir James Cockle’s judgment suggests 
that prosecutions for slaving may have been received differently in his 
own Vice-Admiralty Court in Brisbane. However, the Kidnapping 
Act was passed within a year. Action against blackbirding practices 
would then take, for the Australian colonies, a more acceptable form 
and, I suggest, a more effective one. 
4. THE KIDNAPPING ACT
After his decision in the Daphne, Sir Alfred Stephen made ‘a hasty 
suggestion’ that the slave trade legislation be amended, deeming a 
kidnapped person to be a slave. He was nevertheless concerned about 
the harshness of the penalties for slaving, and over time revised this 
opinion.[93] As early as 1862, the Imperial Government had a draft 
bill addressing any slave trading in the Pacific and, in 1870, had 
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refined clauses that could deal with kidnapping. The Daphne showed 
that special legislation was required, but the immediate stimulus for 
imperial intervention was the murder of Bishop Patteson at Nukapu in 
the Santa Cruz Group, on 20 September 1871. The state of Patteson’s 
body strongly suggested that his death had been payback for the 
stealing of five boys from the island by blackbirders who had 
impersonated the bishop.94 Public reaction was strong, in the 
Australian colonies and the United Kingdom. At a public meeting in 
Sydney Stephen, though still cautious about blaming the recruiters, 
demanded close regulation of recruiting vessels and enhanced powers 
for the navy to seize noncompliant ships.[95] The Kidnapping Act did 
that, though in more exacting terms than Stephen would think prudent.
The stated purpose of the Act was to protect ‘natives of islands in the 
Pacific Ocean, not being in Her Majesty’s dominions, nor within the 
jurisdiction of any civilized power’.[96] This effectively excluded 
islanders from New Caledonia, the Loyalties, and the continental side 
of Torres Strait that had been annexed to Queensland in May 1872.97 
Despite its name, the Kidnapping Act’s central prohibition was on the 
carrying of islanders on a British ship unless they were its crew or the 
master had lodged a £500 bond and was licensed by a Governor or 
consul. The Act also addressed abduction, whether by deception or 
force, and included an appropriate equipment clause.[98] There were 
enhanced powers to seize British ships suspected of being engaged in 
any of these offences or, again, equipped to carry them out. The Vice-
Admiralty courts had powers to condemn ships that were involved in 
unlawful carrying or abduction.[99]
Initially at least,[100] it was envisaged that the responsibility for 
interpreting the Kidnapping Act would rest with the Australasian 
courts,[101] and it took little time for them to show how rigorous the 
legislation was. In early 1873 pearling vessels were vacating Torres 
Strait, having been warned that HMS Basilisk was being sent there to 
deal with labour practices in the pearl shelling industry. However, 
between Cardwell and Cape York Basilisk’s captain, John Moresby, 
seized four pearlers on which he found Melanesian divers, and 
evidence of blackbirding and unpaid service.[102] Three actions under 
the Kidnapping Act followed. 
In defending proceedings for the forfeiture of the Crishna in the 
Brisbane Vice-Admiralty Court, Samuel Griffith argued that offences 
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under the Act required an intention to carry islanders unlawfully and, 
so far as the owners of the ship were concerned, knowledge that 
islanders were being carried unlawfully.[103] The argument borrowed 
from WB Dalley’s successful submissions in the committal 
proceedings in the Daphne, Griffith analogising loosely from 
adjudication on the slave trade legislation.[104] But the judge 
commissary, Sir James Cockle, reached the extraordinary conclusion 
that mens rea was not an element of the offence. A conviction would 
be entered where the ship was merely carrying islanders.[105] Three 
months later in Sydney, Sir Alfred Stephen’s decisions in actions for 
forfeiture of the Melanie[106] and the Challenge[107] (already 
impugned in Longmuir) proceeded on the same assumption that no 
element of intention was required to commit the offence of unlawful 
carrying. This evidently perturbed Stephen and, while ordering both 
ships to be condemned, he recommended that the Government restore 
them to the owners.[108] Ultimately, the Privy Council annulled both 
orders on the grounds that Stephen had used ‘retrospective evidence’ 
and that the masters had proved an intention to obtain licences. The 
Crishna remained condemned.[109]
The passage of the Kidnapping Act did not resolve the political 
question whether the labour trade was slaving. If Queen Victoria’s 
speech from the throne in 1872 is any indication, the Imperial 
Government planned the Act as a measure to deal with ‘[t]he Slave 
Trade, and practices scarcely to be distinguished from Slave 
Trading.’[110] However, legislation that was effective to deal with 
blackbirding had to immunise legal argument and adjudication from 
the question of slavery altogether. This was especially so while the 
leading advocate for the case that the labour trade was not slaving was 
the leading Admiralty judge in the Pacific, Sir Alfred Stephen. His 
role in this connection is significant, in that he tried to have Palmer 
drop the case for condemnation of the Daphne and, eventually, 
decided against him on the basis of his own researches and without 
any assistance from defence counsel. I do not suggest that the degree 
of personal initiative Stephen took in dealing with the action against 
the Daphne was untoward, or that Palmer’s case should have 
succeeded. However, Stephen’s doubts that the slave trade legislation 
had any operation in the Pacific rested on tenuous grounds. These 
doubts may have represented an unwillingness to admit that there was 
any trade approaching slaving within New South Wales’ sphere of 
influence, or an effort to depoliticise prosecutions of the emotive 
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slaving question altogether. This may also explain Stephen’s feeling 
that the Kidnapping Act was heavy-handed and, oddly for a judge so 
notorious for harsh sentencing,[111] his appeals for executive leniency 
in the Melanie and the Challenge. 
There was some evidence in the Melanie, the Challenge and the 
Crishna that islanders had been abducted, and were working without 
pay and, perhaps, for indefinite periods.[112] These might have been 
stronger cases for slave trading prosecutions, but the Daphne ensured 
that the slave trade legislation would not be raised. To secure 
convictions for blackbirding, the question of slaving had to be 
avoided in the courts. As Coath showed, the language of kidnapping 
provided that opportunity. Leaving labouring conditions in 
Queensland to one side, the problem in the islands was physical 
abduction or enticement and the problem in the courts was proving 
that. Certainly, the effectiveness of the Kidnapping Act was helped by 
lessons learned in legislating on transatlantic slaving. The offence of 
unlawful carrying extended the logic of the equipment clause, and 
treated an unlicensed ship as a blackbirder merely because 
Melanesians were found on board. Equally, however, its effectiveness 
also depended on removing structural weaknesses in the slave trade 
legislation: the prohibition was on a mere carrying of islanders 
(irrespective of its purpose), and it was strictly imposed. So, while the 
Imperial Government considered the Kidnapping Act as a measure to 
address a slave trade, the scrupulous avoidance of any reference to 
slavery in the legislation itself removed prosecutions from the politics 
of slaving completely. This may not have been the law that Sir Alfred 
Stephen wanted, but he was right in that, so far as blackbirding cases 
in court were concerned, it was better not to talk about slaving at all.
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 Reid Mortensen is a Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of 
Queensland, Australia.
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